The nature of the human conatus
In his seminal work Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order, Spinoza used the term conatus —derived from the Latin verb conari (to try), meaning effort, endeavour, striving, or impulse— to account for that effort that anything performs in order to persevere in its own being.
The development of the concept can readily be found in Part III, Propositions 6 and 7, of the Ethics, where, according to the Dutch philosopher, "the effort with which anything strives for perseverance in its being is nothing apart from the actual essence of the thing itself."
As Spinoza logically infers, this potency abiding in each of us stems necessarily from our very nature, which allows us to interpret its manifestation, i.e., its factual production, as an apodictic extension of the only thing we are and can ever be.
So we, as modes of God, are bound to express its attributes through our own being in a very particular, or shall I say "personal", way. And although this is further explained in the Ethics regarding our mind, our will, and appetite, I would like to remain focused on its conceptual core, that is, its primal and crude inception.
Now, in Spinoza, the concept of God conveys a panentheistic scheme of reality which, in Part II of the Ethics, is clearly endorsed in Proposition 15, as he asserts: "Everything that is, is in God, and nothing can be, nor can it be conceived, without God."
This unavoidably leads us to establish God as the sole substance in existence —both indivisible and infinite—, which, in essence, draws us to identify God with existence itself.
Additionally, we should specify that, though modes by which the infinite attributes of God emerge or actualize, humans entail the expression of each of the eternal and infinite essences contained within God.
What I propose then is to extend Spinoza's notion beyond its original scope, surpassing the consideration that is typically assigned to the conatus when presented as a mere sign of preservation. This calls for a wider consideration in which the force of being embodies its will for affirmation, resulting in that inevitable effect of conservation.
Nevertheless, notice that the expression I'm referring to cannot be thus static or reducible to a deliberate string of action, born as a result of a conscious eagerness, however impinged in the limitations that define the life of the subject we now embody and identify with our ego.
What I postulate is an unmediated drive that penetrates us in an irresistible fashion and therefore functions as a conditioning substrate to every potency we inherit. Something like a fundamental operating system that nature imprints organically at the heart of our being. In other words, a non-negotiable state which the mind does not control, for it is connaturally ingrained in it, in so far as its functioning defines the phenomenal scope of the viable, the consequent, namely, of the human potential unfolding.
Consequently, we should not consider this conceptual deviation from Spinoza's conatus as a mere ontological channel of the infinitely multiple, despite it being rooted in the singular substance that constitutes reality. On the contrary, this implies an intrinsic structural quality of the Spinozist conatus, and hence a unique ontological apparatus which mechanistically filters the uncountable array of possibilities nested in existence.
From a certain perspective, we could probably associate the former with Whitehead's processual philosophy. In this regard, the infinite potentiality allocated in the universe as "eternal objects" is realized in "actual entities", which themselves can individually be defined as elementary processes of experience.
In our case, however, the qualification undergone by actual entities due to the influence of eternal objects will natively be patterned in its processual occurrence.
The question at this moment should thus address the nature of that inherent structure which predicates every stance of actualization.
To that effect, what if our conatus is fundamentally explorative, inasmuch as it induces a teleological proclivity that is embedded in us in order to elicit a processual compound formed by two reciprocal elements: the actions of discovery and creation —understood as phenomena that happen simultaneously and are ontologically intrinsic to one another—?
Moreover, this idiosyncratic pattern would have to be subsumed under the category of the empirical, for it is the primordial predicament of subjectivity which, in coherence with analytic idealism's view, could also be considered as of reality's grounding.
Based on that premise, could we then infer that the previously mentioned potentialities are the elemental properties of consciousness, on account of their actualization constituting the precondition for the unfolding of existence?
Looking at this train of thought from a different angle, conatus must be conceived as totally detached from any form of agency, since it intrinsically transcends the realm of individuality. Therefore, its actualization does not depend on intention, will, or appetite, because, to some extent, its potential state is unconditionally conjoined to every possible action or inaction.
To clarify our stance, conatus is presented thus as a primordial element of experience, consubstantial to the ontological pillars that sustain reality, insofar as it is accepted as subjectively constituted.
As a result, each and every conduct, however active or passive, conscious or unconscious, on the part of the agent, carries within the substantiality of discovery and creation.
Even sensory-deprived stillness implies experience, and no experience is absent from the dual ontological substrate we're conveying.
The reason for it is that as soon as potency is transformed into phenomena, —either tangible, and hence perceptible, or mental— creation and discovery are inescapable to the subject, for it basically functions as an extension of the ontological primeval, which, as we argued, could fairly correspond to consciousness or subjectivity itself.
Considering the above, and hence the apparent ontological prowess of humans among other beings —at least according to our actual knowledge—, should we conceive the former as "a gift", "a curse" or —as I understand it— as both?
Understanding that as a curse could happen because of two reasons: On the one hand, our capacity for discovery and creation —preceded by its consubstantial drive— poses an enormous obstacle for us to embody the present moment, that is, to experience the actual instant to its fullest. Such an argument relies on the fact that our mind is constantly captivated by the goal-oriented telos, which, as I affirm, is deeply encoded in us.
On the other hand, the striving for generation is intimately linked with the necessity for accomplishment, which, subsequently, results in a quasi-pathological hunger for recognition or validation. Regrettably, the consequence of this paradigmatic inclination, in its most aggressive manifestation, deprives us of the possibility of harvesting the real value of being itself.
Furthermore, the unrestrained aiming for achievement marches along with the shadow of ambition, in a way that feeds the eruption of what Nietzsche referred to as "the will to power."
Be that as it may, what can we actually do? Do we even have a choice?
Besides any intellectual, philosophical, or scientific connotation, I find it worthless to dispute our deterministic foundation.
In fact, the endless wealth of potentiality, even if constant in its structure, still remains a promise of the unfathomable outburst that encompasses our capacity for creation.
Hence, in spite of continuing to pursue good and truth to the extent of our ability, perhaps the conundrum resides in accepting our human nature as it is, in its whole rawness.
Recalling again what Spinoza asserted —though interpreted in line with our argument— the fundament of virtue might well be the conatus.
And while reason should indeed perform as our guide, what if perseverance in existence is not necessarily coupled with self-preservation? Furthermore, what if creation is the seed to our inevitable and final annihilation?
Perhaps Spinoza was right when he stated in his Ethics, Part IV, Proposition 28, that "The highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the highest virtue of the mind is to know God."
But again, at what expense?
Denying our immanent disposition on behalf of moral correction is surely legitimate and, of course, socially preferable, yet we shouldn't fool ourselves into thinking that it will prevent the shape of our foreseen destination.
So, if everything in us is prone to discovery and creation, and if they, consubstantially, involve destruction, for every shattering elicits a form of creation —not only sequentially, in a potential sense, but inherently, and in rigour—, isn't the whole spectrum of our actions an expression of God, as we argued before?
And isn't unleashing our creative potential the only mandate we can receive from existence, hence, the single way to know what Spinoza referred to as God?
As waves can neither depart from the ocean nor change their essential dynamics, neither can we, as mere humans, refuse or negate our true nature and its predicaments.
So, while reason and value serve as our beacons, we might as well learn to rest at the source we belong to and always inhabit. Just as waves do, while returning to the vastness of water.
Bibliography and Sources
- Spinoza, B., Ethics, Demonstrated in Geometrical Order. Trans. Pedro Lomba. Trotta, 2019. Available at: https://www.trotta.es/libros/etica-demostrada-segun-el-orden-geometrico/9788498797848/
- Henning, Brian G., "Alfred North Whitehead", in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.). Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/whitehead/
Translations from Spinoza's Ethics into English are the author's own, based on the Spanish edition referenced above (trans. Pedro Lomba, Trotta, 2019).
© Abraham Meghji Ramos 2026. This text is protected by copyright. Citation and partial use are permitted with full attribution to the author and a link to the source. Reproduction without credit or for purposes of appropriation is expressly prohibited.